奇爱博士

(PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORKER, BY ERIC SCHLOSSER, ON JANUARY 23, 2014)

This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as “dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When “Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that dictum. Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids” from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.

The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a communications breakdown prevented NATO officers from contacting the White House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership? Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?

With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and “the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.” Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on this matter.”

President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them. Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United States.

In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group, was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew, in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.

* * *
The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961: “all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes.”

After a crash program to develop the new control technology, during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed by NATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional, psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Despite public assurances that everything was fully under control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years, consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove” ’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start a nuclear war.

Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.

* * *
The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon, each of them provided with half the code. Category A PALs were useful mainly to delay unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.

The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge. Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.

The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”

Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount” of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia, behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square. Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play the guitar.

While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S. national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”

The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if you keep it a secret!”

A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film. Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated, Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years after the Cold War ended.

In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the Pentagon, and the mainstream media.

“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak, and terrifyingly on the mark.



___________________________________


AND THIS IS REALLY COOL:
Top secret documents released by the Pentagon:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/primary-sources-permissive-action-links-and-the-threat-of-nuclear-war.html

重提疯癫与文明
——评《奇爱博士》、《发条橙》和《飞越疯人院》

福柯自有《疯癫与文明》一书，而结合福柯异于常人的性取向来看，也许真的有很多不明就里的人会认为福柯自己本身就是一个疯子。可是，要知道《疯癫与文明》本质上是一部历史学著作，而福柯的哲学思考，或者说他人对福柯及其理论的哲学解释，都是基于历史而言的。然而要在中国的语境下去理解福柯所叙述的疯癫与文明的关系史，几乎很容易产生偏差，尤其是只有印刷文本的情况下。因为中国并没有疯人院，或者说精神病院的历史，要说有，那也是20世纪的精神病院，这与西方漫长的处理“疯人”的历史相比，是小巫见大巫。所以，当一位不研究西方的中国人提到“疯狂”这个词时，贬抑的含义是会首先进入他或她的脑海的。在中国考察“疯”一字，恐怕没有一段与之相关的历史。《集韵》称“疯”为头风病，即脑血栓之意。以“疯”指称“精神错乱”，怕是20世纪之后的含义，说不定也与东亚某国的语言有关。而到近些年，我们学着西方，把一些中性的含义也加入了“疯”一字，指做事的反常。这便慢慢接近西方语言了。另外，“癫”字更常见地是与“疯”同义，而自近代以来也逐渐包含了“不羁”的意思。福柯在他的疯癫历史书中，讲述了从文艺复兴时期开始的西方“文明社会”对“疯癫”以及“疯癫之人”的看法的流变，正如我刚才所说，这并未在“例外的例外”的中国土地上出现。

进入21世纪，影像文本开始广泛参与“文化研究”。所谓“文化研究”，想必反映了博学的大师们，对人文领域的一切现象进行考察的梦想。文化研究者的一个预设是，某一现象绝非单纯的哲学的、历史的、文学的或社会学的现象，它必定为各方面因素联动的结果，任意一方面因素的单独解释都是不完美的，都不能揭示这一现象的“真实”。因此，它们致力于让自己博学，于是影像文本便成为文化研究不可或缺的对象之一。在拙文中将要提及的三部影片，《奇爱博士》（1964年）、《发条橙》（1971年）和《飞越疯人院》（1975年），除了第一部，想必都是文化研究者不应遗漏的文本吧。笔者不愿意，也没有能力成为一位博学的文化研究者，只是希望在拙文中胡乱书写一些小感想，其抛砖引玉之功，便是想让文化大家们略略回头，你们是否在考察过去的现象时也不应忽视影像文本呢？

《飞越疯人院》的英文原名大意是“飞越杜鹃巢之人”，将“杜鹃巢”译为疯人院，是一个并不非常聪明的做法。尽管字典上很明白地写着，“杜鹃”在某些情况下就是指“缺乏理智、愚蠢、疯狂”，不过我想不是每位观众都会去翻字典的。和拙文主题联系最紧密的也就是此片，它直接地将故事设置在一家精神病院之中。很多时候我们还是会把取难而舍易，认为精神病院就是一个社会，或者说一个政府，病人就是社会中的被政府所管辖的个体。这样想没有问题，但是，影片所表现的精神病院的规则，并没有太多的夸张和虚饰——就应该如此（网上某篇影评认为此片表现了“资本主义社会精神病院的罪恶”）。我们不应在还未弄清楚精神病院和病人本身关系之前，就开始大谈政府和社会，政府和个人的问题，然后去联系捷克裔导演佛曼“布拉格之春”后的逃亡。

是精神病院认为病人是有精神问题的吗？理解影片之后，我们会得到否定的答案。首先，除了麦克墨菲，其他病人几乎都是自愿来到医院接受治疗的。其次，从某种意义上说，麦克墨菲也是自愿前来的（装病），他的个人特殊性在于他在来之前是一名罪犯，因此他终究无法“想走就走”。第三，医院无法确定麦克墨菲是患病的，所以他们才将他留下继续观察。这样，精神病院是影片中包括麦克墨菲的所有人的避难所，只是因为麦克墨菲本身有着强烈的个性，所以他尽管逃避了监狱中的繁重劳动，但并没有在医院中获得满足。麦克墨菲的个性和身份是为了情节发展而设定的，是一种偶然性的因素。要分析疯癫，我们的关注点就不应在麦克墨菲身上：他自始至终都没有认为自己发生了精神错乱。而那些像哈定、比利之类的人物，他们自己觉得自己不正常，这才是关键所在。

让我们暂停一下，跳到《发条橙》一片上。笔者认为此片最能揭示中心的一句台词，是在影片第二部分的结尾处。那里，主角亚历克斯接受了研究所的心理治疗，从而对暴力和性产生了极度的厌恶。尝到这项心理治疗计划的内政部长弗雷德里克认为，痊愈的人们将不再使他人受难，而是永远使自己受难——人人都将被拯救，人人都将是耶稣。可惜的是，当前只有亚历克斯一人得到了“拯救”，如果世界上只有他一位神灵，那么他的结果就是被恶魔所击垮。当然，影片最后让亚历克斯这位现代世界的耶稣如圣经故事所述一般复活了，那么，如同老年黑人所说的失却法律和秩序的肮脏的现代世界，就因耶稣的死而警醒了吗？影片的结束画面仍然是性爱，受人们所鼓励和支持的性爱。内政部长的得意的“消灭犯罪”的计划，在舞台上就差点为一名貌似反对党政治家的发言所完全驳倒。这名反对党说，亚历克斯现在已经没有任何选择了，尤其是没有道德上的选择，他无法选择去从善或者从恶。反讽的是，不论是内政部长还是亚历克斯自己，亚历克斯走出研究所的时候，都不断地暗示：从现在起，你自由了。显然，影片希望说明的是，当道德标准也成为政府的统一政策时，那人们就真正是被上了发条了。

回到疯人院。疯人院是政府或者社会，或者说“文明”所设立的，历史地看，疯人院中的疯人便是“不文明”的人。亚历克斯被强制送到监狱或者研究所去“文明化”，而哈定和比利则自愿地或半自愿地进入医院接受“文明化”。如果后者不进入医院，那么他们会被“文明”看作“不文明”的人，最终的结果也是强制性的。观众可能还记得这样一个场景。麦克墨菲问拉契德护士，他能不能不吃药，搞特殊。拉契德护士回答他说，他不自觉吃药，医院自然有办法强制他吃药。在《飞越疯人院》的整个剧情中，麦克墨菲始终在抵制医院的治疗，但他没有一次是能战胜医院的保安而按照其自由意志行动的。那么，“文明”所认为的疯癫与不疯癫之间的界线是什么呢？正如福柯所说，一切都是理性惹的祸。自文艺复兴时期到19世纪，疯人的悲惨史决不能怪罪于某一特定的社会或政府，而是应该让理性，还有秉持理性理想的人们进行深刻的反思。甚至可以这么说，没有理性，就没有疯癫的历史。

理性本身是无罪的，理性也不负有原罪。但在疯癫史上，为何理性如同鲁迅笔下的礼教一般吃人了呢？在《发条橙》和《飞越疯人院》两部影片中，我们都深深地为不理性的罪犯和病人们同情。我随机问过一些《飞越疯人院》的观众，问他们：拉契德护士是正面角色还是反面角色？回答都是反面角色。然而，理性没有错，同时理性也不能被迷信。犯罪难道不应该被打击吗？如果不是，那为什么几乎所有观众都会在《发条橙》中的暴力和强奸式或滥交式性爱镜头感到不适？影片的第三部分弥漫着深深的忧虑和思考，到底应该让“文明”去为人们选择理性，还是让人们在犯罪之前自觉地选择理性？这种自觉性是否可能？也许，自愿进入疯人院的那些病人在某种程度上已经是自觉的了，但是他们在进入医院之前已经对社会造成了某种危害和混乱，所以这里的自觉并不完全。印第安人最后成功逃出医院，奔向未知，我们仍然没有看到答案。

答案在《奇爱博士》之中吗？影片很短，一群“疯狂”的人们将人类文明导向毁灭。影片的反战主题十分明显，然而，核战争的爆发原因却是荒诞的。片中，美国总统可能认为除了他自己，所有人都已进入疯癫状态，殊不知，对苏联实施核打击的作战制度却是通过“民主”讨论后得出的，美国总统也参与了这些讨论。因此，民主也并不意味着根本的理性，否则，“理性”的美国总统也不至于很难挽回严重的后果。也许，里帕将军的过于敏感和性问题确实让他不会理性；也许，奇爱博士对世界末日和人类毁灭和地下生活的向往使他看起来是最不理性的一个人；可是，世界末日的到来却不仅仅来自于这两个人的冲动和科学技术，也不仅仅来自于美国人民的民主制度所造成的无可挽回的核攻击计划，而是还要加上会被自动触发的苏联人的“末日武器”。如果将世界浓缩为冷战时期的两个超级大国，那么人类的毁灭竟然是人类自己导致的，也就是说，自杀，这一永远被定义为疯狂的举动的动机，竟然是大多数人的不疯狂、大多数人的理性。

综合三部影片看，理性到了穷途末路的地步：理性首先无法为人类自觉地选择，而强制地灌输理性则是不理性的；另一方面，大多数人的理性甚至有可能导致世界末日，而非乌托邦。三部影片的拍摄年代距今已有三十年，今天的我们重提理性的话题，但有时间和精力去思考理性的人已经变少了。在这个连思想都是可以被消费的时代，人类能够从财富的汪洋之中探出头来，静心凝望头顶的星空并敬畏之吗？

【作者:西夏 原载于《科幻世界》07年第四期】

[故事] 战略空军基地将军将自己的性功能障碍归咎于水中加氟防治坏牙的科学方法，认为这是苏联企图毒化美国人体液的阴谋，于是下令空中24小时巡弋待命的核弹轰炸机队进攻苏联，并以全面核战为由关闭了基地通讯。大惊失色的国防部为避免偶然核战，一面想法召回飞机，一面与政要紧急磋商。由于意识到苏联的核反击将毁灭美国，军方建议干脆乘机实施全面核攻击，从而借此永远解决苏联威胁问题；而总统为了和平，试图请求苏军帮忙击落自己的飞机，却惊恐得知苏联已制造了足以摧毁地球的“末日装置”，该装置会在苏联遭到核攻击时自动启动，无法阻止。终于，一架B-52载着两枚氢弹越过艰险击中目标，核毁灭被启动之际，名为“奇爱”的科学博士现身国防部作战室，开始用自己无与伦比的智慧和无法抑制的激动，描述起一个令人向往的地下矿坑生存蓝图……

[起源和闲话] 本片小说原著《红色警戒》，作者彼得·乔治二战时曾为英国皇家空军情报官，据说曾在空军基地被一架掠过头顶的美军B-47轰炸机震得咖啡杯摔在地上，边上人评说一句“第三次世界大战就会这样来临”竟使乔治猛得灵感，三星期写出了《红色警戒》，跟克鲁亚克写《在路上》一样快。注意这个《红色警戒》跟那个即时战略游戏《红色警戒》系列没有关系。电影对于当年的核威慑极尽嘲弄，没想到在电影完成两年后原作者乔治本人竟不堪核战恐惧而于1966年6月自杀身亡，由于小说本身的文学成就并不算高，电影《奇爱博士》就成了我们依稀记住这位先觉者的唯一凭据了。所幸《奇》片在很多“一百”名单上位居前茅，1989年美国国会图书馆因其“重要文化意义” 而与《公民凯恩》、《飘》、《卡萨布兰卡》、《绿野仙踪》等一起列进第一批国家电影保护收藏目录。

[背景] 却说1960年代冷战突然加剧，猪湾事件和古巴导弹危机使得核毁灭的幽灵突然从世人生活的背景被调到前台，反映核焦虑的西方科幻-灾难片开始丢掉50年代的种种动物寓言面具，而出现咄咄逼人的现实景象，先有《海滨》（On the Beach，1959），后有纪录式的《战争游戏》(The War Game, 1965)，同期还有《奇幻核子战》（Fail-Safe，1964)。那时库布里克为准备一部关于核威慑的电影，已经刻苦研究学习了三四年，忽一日，美国经济学家托马斯·谢林（Thomas Schelling）在飞机上读到小说《红色警戒》，视为一个描述偶然核战的绝好案列，在《原子科学家通讯》上发表了一篇评该小说的文章，竟被库布里克读到，二人当即联络并跟彼得·乔治谈下了电影改编权。那个托马斯·谢林，因广涉运筹学、外交学、国家安全、核战略、军备控制理论，在四十年后的2005年，“以其博弈理论（game theory）增加了我们对于冲突与合作的理解”而获诺贝尔经济学奖，这是另外话题。

小说版的《奇爱博士》是个一本正经的故事，库布里克却发现因为“核威慑”主题内在的非逻辑以至荒诞性，电影完全没法拍成正剧，终于以我们现在看到的黑色荒诞的模样，成为美国电影学院“百年最佳”排行榜上第三好笑的电影。不过中文观众看字幕很难觉得这部电影有那么好笑；就算是英语观众也很难同意该片到底有多好笑。毕竟因为核毁灭这样的沉重主题，很多观众即使谨慎笑起来也是怀着神经质的紧张和负罪心理，这在电影史上绝无仅有。

 

[核威慑] 美国科学家联盟的太空战略、国际安全及军情分析大腕约翰·派克（John Pike）曾说，“关于核战略的所有东西，都可以从《奇爱博士》学到。”正因为如此，这部电影现在已经成为大学的国际政治与核战略研究的教科书内容，因为它把核威慑的重要而荒谬的逻辑完整呈现了出来。一个空军基地的指挥将官，为什么拥有下达核攻击命令、掌握地球命运的大权？另一方面，为什么苏联的“末日装置”是完全自动反应，不可能被人为因素改变？《奇》片从两个方面展示了核威慑逻辑必然走向的堕落。

 

核战略的核心是“核威慑”。什么是“威慑”？奇爱博士在影片最后是这么说的：“威慑是一种让敌人在发动进攻时产生内心恐惧感的艺术。”——记住了：威慑是一种“艺术”不是“科学”，它需要的是“恐惧感”，而恐惧感，需要有效地传达到你想要打击的敌人的脑筋里面才能激发起来，否则威慑就不存在。所谓“末日装置”在我们的现实中虽然从未真正实现过，但正如奇爱博士所说，它在技术上完全是可能的，因此它高度浓缩了当年美苏的核恐吓战略，该战略名曰Mutual Assured Destruction，即“对等保证摧毁”，缩写成MAD，正巧是“疯狂”一词。疯狂而奇妙的事情，往往牵涉到逻辑的怪圈，核威慑也如此。为了有安全感、为了高人一筹或者为了迎头赶上，你不得不拼命制造核武器；如果MAD状态达到，即通常所说的“核平衡”，那么使用核武器就是不合逻辑的行为，因为谁先攻击谁就会遭到毁灭性报复，而如果有谁被首先攻击，其报复也就变得没有意义，大家都已经玩儿完了，谁还会有心思去报复？另一方面，在真的常规冲突升级的情况下，人的理性在决策核打击时又会陷入逻辑的障碍，更不用说还有情感上的障碍了，于是核战略理论的版本也必须跟着升级，这就势必引入非理性、非人性、或者说不确定的因素，才能继续提高有效的“核威慑”能力，这样我们就逻辑地、或者说非逻辑地有了对非集权的、非统一指挥的攻击作战系统的需求，这就是一个小小的空军基地司令可以发动核大战的原因；也有了自动引爆、完全无法人工控制的反击系统，这就是“末日装置”。让国家和军队把核武器控制权放弃给计算机、各种感应元件、以及任何一个基地司令官，才能确保核恐吓无时无处不在的有效性。这不合逻辑的疯狂结局，变成了核威慑战略的符合逻辑的下一步，虽然当年苏联并未造出末日装置，但他们真的完全可能象电影中的俄国大使那样从《纽约时报》的讨论得到末日装置的灵感，而当年整个欧洲，真的都布满了可以随意发动核大战的空军司令们。奇爱博士说，这是核威慑理念的精髓，可以让大家永远都在理性和非理性的边缘徘徊，在恐惧中不敢轻举妄动。

 

但是人算不如天算，糟糕在于，有个指挥官脑子突然进水或者出水，就心血来潮真的发动了攻击，将一切政治和外交抛诸脑后：“战争太重要了，不能留给政客来处理。”而另一边呢，还没有来得及通告全球自己已经达到MAD状态，给了疯子可乘之机。这些使人发根倒立的“人为错误因子”之上，我们还有戴上牛仔帽的机长“金刚”上校，他训练有素、英勇顽强，率领一班各族人民的杰出代表，以大无畏的美国英雄主义精神跟百折不挠的德克萨斯牛仔气概——他确实不知道自己在干什么——终于使得世界朝着毁灭的方向平稳前进无法逆转。

 

[名词解释] 那个勇敢的上校姓 Kong，美国人除了“金刚”之外，没有别人有这个姓。美军轰炸机的先进上校，为什么有个“金刚”的姓呢？这样我们就不可避免涉及成人内容了（未成年读者请在父母指导下阅读）。所有论家都同意，《奇》片将雄性的性冲动跟雄性好战的攻击特性并置，从片头那个谁也不会漏掉其含义的轰炸机空中加油的“雄起”画面，到最后轰炸机上校骑着导弹飞向地面炸开蘑菇云的“高潮”状态，全片实际上是以战争释放焦虑的一个完整过程，活蹦乱跳的上校简直就是冲在最前面的一枚精子，他（缺）一根筋地冲向目标绝不放弃的劲头，让他姓“金刚”的姓真是再合适不过，何况他在朗读救生物品清单时，还流露出了跟金刚一样的恋物癖。“金刚”瘪着他土得掉渣的德州土音，读到“一套避孕药、三支口红和三双尼龙袜”时，尖着嗓子美滋滋地说：“这些东西够去（拉斯）维加斯混上一个周末了……”。岂止“金刚”，一份深入的研究指出，《奇》片所有名字都带有直白露骨的性意味，这一点翻译版本可能很难传达。如空军基地司令叫做“撕破衣服者”(注)；总司令名字Buck是“雄性动物”，姓Turdginson意味“肿胀，勃起”；美国总统的姓，在粗俗语言中指妓女、阴部、或娘娘腔的男人；苏联大使名字直接跟“萨德”或者“性虐狂”挂钩；苏联总理名字虽是个普通俄国名字，却是阳性形式的生殖女神名，而他的姓Kissov (=kissoff) 意为吻别、吐口水哄走，意思等于“你死去吧）”；那个英国军官的名字呢，不但是一种春药、怀胎药之类的植物，也被某些同性恋组织拿来做标志，而这个角色跟同性恋有关这一点也被故事情节一再证实，以至于陆军军官以为自己奉命来逮捕他是因为他在基地领导了一场“堕落者的暴动”，一见到他就因为他奇怪（漂亮）的制服而嘲笑他是易装癖。也不光是人的名字。轰炸机机舱的第一个镜头就是一本《花花公子》杂志插页图片，覆盖裸身女郎腰部的大书是Miss Foregin Affairs，以“外遇”谐音“外交”；而飞机攻击的第一目标Laputa，则是《格列佛游记》中一群疯狂科学家的岛屿，他们疯狂沉浸于思辨，以至于妻女们要跑到人世间去偷情寻求满足。（熟悉宫崎骏的影迷当然会说，啊，Laputa,那是《天空之城》...）当然最为有名的还是那个发疯的基地将军“撕破衣服者”，打仗的神圣理由，是为了保卫自己和美国人民“宝贵的体液”，在他发布进攻命令的庄严时刻，他嘴里始终把玩的那支雪茄，在仰拍的镜头中不由自主高高翘起来……如果对比原小说就知道，电影版的《奇爱博士》已经把小说中很多低廉玩笑剔除或者弱化了，但影片尾声地球人命在旦夕时的性玩笑，表明所有那些名字的讲究都义有所指。当国防部作战室的所有男人们不分意识形态和国籍、不分军阶、军种，全都津津有味地在奇爱博士“十个女人配一个男人”的奇妙主意下，畅想起未来地下矿坑生活一夫一妻制的必然终结。博士说，所选的女人要具有高度性感的刺激性，而男的要优秀，要包括军方和政界上层，这样在不到100年时间里就可以缔造新的一代优秀的美国人。一时间大家忘了几分钟后全球即将毁灭的事情，迫不及待地要开始跟苏联展开“矿坑竞赛”，战争的雄性本质和荒谬特性可谓一览无遗。

 

现在我们就可以来探讨很多人都忘了问、或者被问到的时候不免语焉不详的问题了：为什么这部电影要以一个情节上不起眼的配角、在片末才出现的“奇爱博士”来命名？那长长的、古怪的片名的后半部分到底是什么意思：奇爱博士，或我是怎样停止焦虑而开始爱上核弹的。原来，这是一个关于“奇怪的爱”的故事，而这种奇怪的爱的最高造诣者正是“奇爱博士”，他不是一般意义上的“配角”，却是所有角色的集大成者，所以在他雄辩地开口之时，所有人都靠边站洗耳恭听：原来战争居然可以绝妙地解决雄性的焦虑，怪不得满屋的眼睛都难以置信地大放光辉。

 

 [博士之爱，和他不听话的右手] 《芝加哥太阳报》的美国影评大腕伊伯特两次撰文、三次发表出来评说《奇》片，都对其结尾很不感冒，认为那一段奇爱博士的演讲完全是画蛇添足。很显然如果不是库布里克的艺术智商太低，就是伊伯特在奇爱面前迷失了靶心，这倒也正好显示了库布里克的叙述结构跟一般好莱坞电影的许诺和造成的期待都无法接轨。拨开“冷战”“核威慑”的面纱，《奇》片跟库布里克后来的《2001》不但有很类似的结尾方式，更有着同一的深层主题，即理性设计了机器，机器按照理性的逻辑完美地运行，最后竟带来人的毁灭。“奇爱博士”就是疯狂理性的化身。当密码终于被破解、大部分飞机终于撤回、作战室里一片欢呼时，“勃起”将军吹口哨带领大家感谢上帝，而奇爱博士呢，在黑暗中静默如一尊蹲伏的幽灵，暂时退出聚光灯，却又像是随时都可能飞扑回来；在得知核毁灭终究不可避免时，他终于一下又回到了视野中心，不但迅速计算出放射性需要多久才能减弱消失，更迅速地、抑制不住亢奋地提出了他绝顶聪明的“后末日” 生存主张。

 

“奇爱博士”的形象取自美国火箭专家布劳恩的身世（纳粹德国V-2导弹之父），加上前国务卿基辛格博士的口音、卷发和他的思想，更有美国核战略专家XX.的影子和言论，而他所效力的“布兰德公司”，当然指的是美国高级智囊“兰德”集团。奇爱博士在黑暗中也始终带着墨镜、始终高度紧张地咧嘴笑谈的煞白的脸庞，恍若邪恶撒旦让人不寒而栗，他演讲起来可以那么天之骄子地昂扬和不容置辩，但他却控制不住自己的右手！那只藏在黑手套中的手，在一片颤栗的抽搐中，要死捏住他的香烟、要卡他脖子、要不停地举起来行纳粹的死亡之礼，透露出他的过往身世。注意“手臂”一词arm，也指武器、军备。在奇爱博士用左手彻底打软了右手（左派、右派？）之后，世界毁灭的冲击波下他突然激动地从轮椅上站了起来，弗兰肯斯坦般冲向前方并狂喜地用德文高呼，不是“上帝啊我站起来了”，而是“领袖啊！我站起来了！！”这是本片最后一句台词，就算你不懂德文、不懂英文，那发音的物理质感也足令人毛骨悚然。

 

我们已经没有篇幅来讨论《奇》片的视觉风格、以及用口语来讨论天下大事的语言风格怎样支持电影的理念并丰富了表达，以及精彩的表演（包括塞勒斯一人出演三个角色）怎样将一个荒唐的故事演绎得栩栩如生真实可信，但必须提及库布里克绝妙的音乐使用。先有片初的飞机做爱歌曲《请再温柔一些》，片末地球的核爆狂欢中则有爵士老歌《我们还会再相聚》。德州上校不合时宜的牛仔爱国主义，跟二战爱国歌曲《强尼大步回家乡》那紧锣密奏的小军鼓真是相映成趣，伴着这首曲子，金刚上校骑氢弹如骑疯牛的末日姿态已经进入了电影史上永被记住的圣像行列，而那句“宝贵的体液”，也已成为美国电影四大经典台词之一。

 

《奇爱博士》拍摄四年后，库布里克拍摄了《2001：太空奥德赛》，那时核危机依然高悬如达摩克里斯之剑，所以《2001》里面那根著名的白骨，扔上太空后变成的那个乳白色的巨大太空物件不是别的，正是用于星球大战的地球同步轨道核武器。现在虽然全世界的核武储存已$经大为减少，不要忘了它们依然足够把我们活着和死去的人都摧毁若干个轮回。

=====================================================


关于文中空军司令 Jack Ripper 名字的含义，本人一不留神，就闹了一个无知的谬误，让人大跌眼镜事小，以讹传讹就是罪魁祸首了。现转抄维基中文几个段落，请那些转贴了本文的热心人们，麻烦再贴一遍，总不能我去一个个更正吧......

【Jack the Pipper——开膛手杰克】

奇爱博士是谁？美国政府雇用的高级科研人员，负责研发用于冷战的高尖端核武器以及相关的一系列攻击防御系统。一个德裔美国人。一个笼罩在阴影中的瘫子，坐轮椅的。一个右手戴着黑色皮手套行动不正常的人。一个混入美国政府的纳粹余孽。一个被恶魔控制的人。是的，恶魔。正如恰达耶夫不是思想，而是一种精神，被恶魔控制的精神。纳粹，共产党，苏维埃，美国精神，资本主义，爱国主义统统都是恶魔。它们宣扬一种仇恨，弱肉强食，优胜劣汰的仇恨。以崇拜强权的名义宣扬的一种仇恨。它们管这叫爱。爱国，爱领袖云云。所以国家要强大，搞核竞赛，压倒敌人。领袖要造神，万能，完美无缺，字字皆真理。
一个阳痿的自大狂，一个被训练过度的飞行员（核战英雄？牛仔帽暗示什么？），一个在地球表面被核辐射笼罩后，躲在地下矿井里仍要藏起一颗核弹与苏联继续竞赛的美国将军，一个陷入泥潭，无能为力的美国总统，一个研发出毁灭世界的机器的国家政权。影片中，一切荒诞的，可笑的，恐怖的，都是恶魔受到人类崇拜后的产物。
现在冷战结束了，纳粹早完蛋了，苏联也解体了。那么我们是否可以以较为轻松的心情来看这部电影呢？我觉得不大可能。因为影片中表现的一切细节，现在依然成立。